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354 ESTATE OF Knw. 
[19 C. (2d) 
[Sac. No. 5356. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1942.] 
Estate of FRANK J. KING, Deceased. FRANK A. KING, 
Executor, etc., et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPHINE KING, 
Executrix, . etc., Respondent. 
[1] 
[2] 
Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Powers, 
etc.-Decedent's Business-Continuillg.-A provision in a will 
authorizing an executor to retain cattle and horses for one year 
and directillg a sale when advantageous is authority for carry"" 
ing on the business until a sale call be made to advantage. Such 
authorization is not affected hy the election of the widow to 
inherit her share under the rules of succession. 
Id.-Executors and Administrators-Powers, etc.-Rights as 
to Property-Care-Presumption.-It is the duty of an exec-
utor, with or without an order of court, to take charge of the 
property of an estate and to preserve it in as good cOll'lition as 
is reasonably possible pendil,g administration., In estate pro-
ceedings involving a cattle enterprise which an executor was 
empowered to conduct, it must be presumed in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary that the stock was properly cared for, 
that the expense of doing so was necessarily incurred, and that 
the horses and cattle were sold as promptly as was for the best 
interest of the estate. 
[3] Id.-Executors and Administrators - Compensation - Extra 
Compensation - Carrying on Business.-An executor who is 
authorized by the will to carry on the business of the deceased 
[4] 
person and who conducts such business at a profit is properly 
allowed extra compensation therefor. The amount thereof rests 
in the discretion of the trial court, and its allowance will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears to be excessive. 
Id. _ Executors and Administrators - Compensation - Allow-
ance-Appeal.-The right of appeal from an order allowing an 
executrix extra compensation is waived by failure to give 
notice of appeal within 60 days from the time of the settlement 
of the account. 
[4] See 11A Cal. Jur. 211. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 190; [2] Dece-
dents' Estates, § 181; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 226; [4] Decedents' 
Estates, § 230; [5] Decedents' Estates, § 165; [6] De,cedents' Estates, 
§§ 308
1 
949; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 949. 
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[5] Id.-Executors and Administrators-Collection of Assets-Ob-
ligations of Representative-Limitations.-Under Prob.' Code, 
§ G02, a court may properly charge against the distrihutive 
share of an e~ecutor as devisee or legatee the amount of his 
notes to the deceased, together with interest, where they were 
not barred when they became part of the assets in his hands. 
[6] Id.-Family Support-Right as Statutory: Payment-Resort 
to Assets-Family Allowance.-The right of a widow to recei. vc 
a family allowance, pending the administration of an estute, is 
purely statutory. Such an allowance granted pursuant t.o Prub. 
Corle, § 680, is a charge against any available assets, whether 
community or separate, where the testator made no provision 
in his will thereior and designated no property froID which it 
or any debt was to be paid. The phrase property "not disposed 
of by the will," within Prob. Coae, § 750, doE'S llot include com-
munity property to which the widow succeeds solely by virtue 
of her statutory one-half illterest, which by § 201 bolongs to 
her a.s the surviving wife, nor the husband's COmmUll!ty h!l.lf of 
property over which his tCfltamentary disposiHon fails by her 
renunciation of his will, 311d to which she becomes entitled 
under § 201 as a result of the absencc of an effective testamen-
tary disposition. 
[7] Id.-Payment of Debts - Resort to Assets for Payment-
Family Allowance - Construction of Prob. Code, § 202.-By 
Prob. COele, § 202, providing that commun~*y property passing 
from the control of the hushand by r(~ason of his death, etc., i::; 
subject to his debts, etc., it was not intended that th~ commu-
nity property shoul'" be alone ehargeable wit.h the pay:ne.,.tof 
family allowances and expenses of administration. A contrary 
conslruction mjght. result in chargh~g the obligation of an estate 
to pay family allowance to a widow aga:nst her own community 
intet'c8t in the property, a construction opposed to policy of 
the law with respect to fanu1y allowances. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court o:f Glenn 
County decreeing distributjon al1d from an order settling the 
final account of an executor. R. M. Rankin, Judge. Affirmed. 
Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Daniel S. Carlton, Oliv"er J. Car-
ter and Pcrol Thorpe for Appellants. 
George R. Freeman and Elmer Laine for Respondent. 
[5] Seo lIB Cal. Jur. 554; 21 Am. Jur. 479. 
[6] Sec llA Cal. Jur. 5G5, 513; 21 Am. Jur. 560. 
[7] Treatmmlt of widow's allowance in case of death Qf ht:sbnnd 
intestnte or her election to take against will, no~c 98 A. L. R. 1125. 
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HOUSER, J.,-The cause herein was transferred to this 
court after decision by the District Court of Appeal of the 
Third Appellate District. Upon examination of the record, we 
adopt as the decision of this court the opinion of the District 
Court of Appeal, with such omissions and additions as may 
hereinafter appear. 
"Two sons of Frank J. King, deceased, have appealed from 
the order settling the final account and directing distribution 
of his estate. The appellants also seek to review a previous 
order settling the first annual account of the executors, from 
which no appeal was taken .... 
"Frank J. King died testate, December 12, 1936, at San 
Francisco, leaving surviving him,his widow, Josephine King, 
two sons, Frank A.and William H. King, and a brother 
named George W. King. He left a will ... by the terms of 
which he appointed his widow and his son Frank as coexecu-
tors. The will purported to dispose of his entire separate 
property and of all the community property belonging to 
himself and wife. He willed specific real and personal property 
[which included farm lands and cattle] to each of his heirs. : .. 
Letters testamentary were issued to Josephine King and 
Frank A. King, February 16, 1937. The estate was appraised 
at $49,142.33. The inventory included two unpaid notes 
executed by Frank A. King and payable to his father, both 
of which were matured. One note was for $4,328.10, upon 
which unpaid interest was then due in the sum of $1,363.83. 
That note was appraised at $5,691.93. The other note was 
appraised. at $600.00. . . . 
"The widow renounced her right to inherit property from 
the estate of her husband according to the terms of his will, 
and upon the contrary elected to take her share of the prop-
erty pursuant to the rules of succession. The executors' first 
annual account was settled and approved October 21, 1938. 
In that account the widow was allowed $2,000 extra compen-
sation, to be paid from. the assets of the estate. The order 
making that allowance and settling the account was entered 
October 21, 1938. No appeal was taken from that order 
and it became final. Upon application therefor the court 
also made an award of $100 per month to the widow for 
a family allowance during the process of administration. 
"The final account was settled and distribution of the prop-
erty .of the estate was made and entered September 12. 1939. 
Feb. 1942.] ESTATE OF KING. 
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At that time the assets of the estate were marshaled and the 
expenses of administration were properly apportioned against 
the respective devisees, legatees and heirs in the proportions 
ascertained from the appraised valuations of the distributive 
shares received by each one. Besides the several ranches and 
other personal property on hand for distribution, there was 
$35,090.37 in cash, received from the sales of [several hun-
dred] horses and cattle and from other sources. r~rhe costs 
of administration were $12,277.53. rrhe portion of the costs 
assessed against the widow was the sum of $5,295.09. 
"All of the cash on hand, the two notes and the three 
ranches which are involved on this appeal, are community 
property. rrhose farms were caned respectively the 'Peterich 
Ranch,' the 'Edgewood Ranch,' and the 'M agoffey Ranch' 
[the community ownership in the last-mentioned ranch ex-
tending only to a two-thirds interest]. By the terms of the 
will the Peterich Ranch was devised to the wjdow, together 
with a legacy of $10,000, one-third of the proceeds from the 
sales of horses and cattle, and whatever residue remained. after 
the debts and expenses of administration had been Vaid. The 
will ga ve to Prank A. King the Edgewood Ranch, the Ma-
goffey Ranch, togeth~r with some other property, and a third 
of 1he proceeds from the sales of cattle and horses. 
"Having elected to inherit her share of the estate acco:xling 
to the rules of succession, there was distrlbu ted to Josephine 
King the Peterich Ranch, consisting of 314 acres of land, an 
undivided one-half interest in the Edgewood Ranch, one-third 
interest in the Magoffey Ranch, one-half interest in two small 
notes and cash in the sum of $12,930.37, all of which proper-
ties· distributed to her were her community share thereof, 
except that she took the entire Peterich Ranch undel' sectior.. 
201 of the Probate Code, as community property which was' 
not disposed of by will on account of her renunciation of that 
instrument. 
"In the decree settling the final account and directing dis-
tribution to be made, the court charged Frank A. King with 
the appraised value of the two matured notes as cash jn his 
hands as a coexecutor, aggregating the sum of $6,854.46, 
which he ower. to the estate. From that decree settling the 
final account and directing distributinn of the estate to be 
made,Frank A. King and his brother William have ap-
pealed." 
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"It is contended the court erred in allowing the executrix 
extra compensation for services in conducting a cattle business 
during administratjon [without a previous order of court 
therefor]; that the compensation was wrongfully charged 
against both separate and community property of the estate; 
that the expenses of administration were improperly appor-
tioned; that the community interests of the deceased in cer-
tain real and personal property were illegally distributed to 
the widow, and that Frank A. King was wrongfully charged 
as a coexecutor with the appraised value as cash on hand, of 
[the] two matured notes which he owed the deceased .... 
[1] "We are of the opinion the allowance of $2,000 as 
extra compensation for carrying on the cattle business was 
properly awarded. The will specifically authorized the exe-
cutors to retain the cattle and horses for a period of 'about 
one year from the date of the will,' and they were directed to 
sell them when it was mr,st advantageous to do so. That pro-
vision necessarily infers that the business of carrying on the 
cattle enterprise for a period of at least one year was author-
ized by the testator. The fact that the widow elected to in-
herit her share of the estate in accordance with the rules of 
succession rather than under the provisions of the will, in 
no way abrogated the independent authorization of the testa-
tor to carryon the business until the cattle could be sold to 
advantage. That provision of the will is nevertheless valid 
and binding. . . . The will was dated September 26, 1936. 
On July 12, 1937, a portion of the cattle and horses was sold 
... for $16,776.20. On October 8, 1937, before the year had 
expired, the court made an order under section 572 of the 
Probate Code, authorizing the executors to continue the stock 
business. The following January the balance of the cattle 
was sold . . . for $12,232.25. There is no evidence the stock 
could have been sold to advantage before they were actually 
disposed of. Evidently the business was conducted at a profit, 
for the horses and cattle were appraised at $16,950. They 
were sold for the total sum of $29,008.45. 
[2] "It is the duty of an executor, with or without an 
order of court,. to take charge of the property of an estate 
and to preserve it in as good condition as is reasonably pos-
sible pending administration. (Estate of Fulmer, 203 Cal. 
693 [265 Pac. 920,58 A. L. R. 430] ; Estate of Freud, 131 Cal. 
667 [63 Pac. 1080, 82 Am. St. Rep. 407] ; Estate of Smtith, 
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118 Cal. 462 [50 Pac. 701] ; lIB Cal. Jur. 250, sec. 842; 2 
Bancroft's Prob. Pr., 682, sec. 359.) [See, also, Estate 0/ 
Meyer, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 409,412 (53 Pac. (2d) 984).] In 
the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be presumed 
the stock was properly cared ·for; that the expense of doing 
so was necessarily incurred, and that the horses and cattle 
were sold as promptly as was for the best interest of the estate. 
The court so found. There is evidence to support the finding 
that these duties were performed. 
[3] "The court was authorized under section 902 of the 
Probate Code, as it existed prior to the amendment of that 
section in 1939, to allow additional compensation for the feed-
ing and care of 565 head of horses and cattle belonging to 
the estate. That section then provided in part: 'Such fur-
ther allowances may be made as the court may deem just and 
reasonable for any extraordinary services, such as . . . the 
carrying on of the decedent's business pursuant to the order 
of the court, and such other ... special services as may be 
necessary for the executor or adm1:nistrator to ... perform.' 
(Italics added.) It is said in Reidy v. Bidwell, 70 Cal. App. 
552 [233 Pac. 995], at page 555, there is an exception to the 
general rule that it is not ordinarily the duty of an executor 
to carryon the business of the testator during the administra-
tion of his estate. That exception exists 'where the will of 
the testator expressly creates the power so to do, or where 
the carrying on of a business would be cast upon the executor 
as a necessary means for the preservation of the estate.' " 
(See, also, Estate of Maddalena, 42 Gal. App. (2d) 12 [108 
Pac. (2d) 17] ; Estate of Broome, 162 Cal. 258 [122 Pac. 470] ; 
Estate of 1Vard, 127 Cal. App. 347 [15 Pac. (2d) 901].) And 
in lIB California Jurisprudence, at page 269, it is stated: "A 
power to continue decedent's business may be conferred on 
the executor by will, and the statute providing that the court 
may authorize such continuance recognizes existing law and 
merely adds another method of olltaining authority." 
"\Vhere a continuation of the business of a deceased per-
son during administration results in a profit to the estate, it 
has frel}uently been said the executor is entitled to extra com-
pensation therefor, even thongh he volur..tarHy assumes to 
perform that service. (lIB Cal. Jur; 270, sec. 860; 2 Ban-
croft's Probe Pr., 788, sec. 419.) In the text last cited it is 
said: 'Likewise, for management of farm o~'.erations, because 
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of the chance of loss to the estate and personal liability on 
the part of the representative, extra compensation may be al-
lowed.' ... 
"When extra compensation is allowable for such service, 
the amount which it is proper to fix is within the sound discre-
tion of the probate judge. (Estate of Broome, supra.) The 
amount of extra compensation which has been awarded will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is improperly allowed 
or clearly appears to be excessive .... 
[4] "Moreover the appellants waived their right of ap-
peal from the order allowing extra compensation, by their 
failure to give notice of appeal therefrom within sixty days 
from the time of the settlement of the account .... [Estate 
of Meyer, 11 Oal. App. (2d) 409, 412 [53 Pac. (2<1) 984]; 
Estate of Grant, 131 Oal. 426 [63 Pac. 731] ; Estate of Fer-
nandez,119 Oal. 579 [51 Pac. 851] ; Estate of Ward, 127 Oal. 
App. 347, 351 [15 Pac. (2d) 901] ; Prob. Oode, sec. 1240; 11A 
Oal. Jur., p. 211.] ... [On] October 21, 1938, the probate 
court made and enterel1 its order settling the . . . account. 
That order specifically found that Josephine King performed 
valuable services feeding and caring for the cattle; that her 
special services were worth $2,000, and thereupon allowed 
extraordinary compensation in that amount. . .. The notice 
of appeal in this case is from the order settling the final 
account and making distribution of the estate only, which was 
made and entered September 12, 1939. . . . 
[5] . "The court properly charged against the distributive 
share of the estate received by the executor, Frank A. King, 
[the] two unpaid matured promissory notes executert by him 
to the deceased in his lifetime . . . [which] were included· in 
the inventory as assets of the estate. The appellants contend 
that these notes were· barred by the statute of limitations, 
and that they were therefore erroneously charged to the dis-
tributive shaI'e of the maker of the notes. 
"[On] September 5, 1930, for value received, Frank A. 
King anl1 Graee V. King, executed and delivered to the de-
ceased, Frank J. King, thejI' note for $1,200, payable five 
years after the date thereof. It was never paid. It became 
a paI't of the assets of the estate in the hands of Frank A. 
King, one of the makers thereof, as a coexecutor of the will of 
thcdec:eased. It was dn~ and was appraised at $600. It did 
not cutlaw until FeLruary 6, 1939. Frank A. King qualified 
l lieb. 1942.1 ESTATE OF KING. 
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as executor February 16, 1937. The note was in his hands as 
an executor of the estate for two years before it outlawed. 
"On 1\ovflllber 25, 1932, for a valuable consideration, 
Frank A. King executed and delivered to his father, another 
note for $4,328.10, due one year after the date of execntion. 
It was secured by a mortgage on real property. The note was 
never paid. That note did not outlaw until November 26, 
1937. It was also in the hands of the maker, as executor, for 
about three months before it would outlaw. 
"Section 602 of the Probate Oode charges an executor with 
obligations which he owes to the testator' as so much money 
in his hands.' It provides that such debts shall be included in 
the inventory, and that the executor is liable therefor .... 
"The notes executed by the executor which were due and 
payable, and in his hands as assets of the estate before they 
were outlawed, become chargeable to him as cash on hand, 
and they were therefore properly charged, together with the 
accumulated interest thereon, against his distributive share 
of the estate. (Estate of Clary, 203 Cal. 335 [264 Pac. 242] ; 
Estate of Miner, 46 Oal. 564; Estate of Jones, 115 Oal. App. 
664 [2 Pac. (2d) 483]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Oal. 434 [33 
Pac. 20] ; lIB Oal. Jur. 354, sec. 1100.) In ... Estate of 
Clary, supra, it is said: ' ... as pointed out in 16 Oalifornia 
Jurisprudence, page 420 et seq., sections 30 to 37, the rule is 
that the statute of limitations does not run where the parties 
occupy a fiduciary relationship toward each 'other, so long 
as such relationship is not repudiated .... [I] rrespective of the 
lapse of time which would ordinarily bar an action upon the 
note, the executor, by reaSOn of his fiduciary capacity becom-
ing chargeable with the note in his hands as so much money, 
is ·in that capacity precluded from pleading the bar of the 
statute, and, therefore, so long as the trust relatio'n continues, 
the statute does not run.' . 
"It has been held that an executor, by virtue of his fidu-
ciary relationship, is not only chargeable with the principal 
sum of a note Which. he owes to the deceased, if· it is not out-
lawed before he accepts that trust, but he is also chargeable 
with the interest due thereon, as cash in his hands. (Estate 
of Miner, supraj lIB Oal. Jur. 556, sec. 1100.) In Estate of 
M'iner, sup,"a, the court says with respect to the obligation of 
the executor to pay both principal and interest of a note whit;h 
he owes to the deceased : 'We think there was no error in 
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charging the administrator with the amount of his own note 
and the stipu1ated interest. It is a debt due to the estate 
and has never been paid. The money has remained in h:s 
hands, not separated or set apart from his private funds or 
been devoted to the uses of the estate. Under what circum-
stances an administrator will become liable to pay interest is 
discussed in Estate of Mary McQueen, 44 Cal. 584, and upon 
the principles settled in that case we think the administrator 
cannot escape the payment of interest.' " 
[6] "The appellants contend that the court erroneously 
directed payment of the family allowance, which was previ-
ously granted to the widow under section 680 of the Probate 
Code, to be charged against the' devisees and legatees in the 
proportions that they respectively share in the properties, 
both community and separate,' upon final distrjlmtion. It 
is asserted the entire amount of family allowance granted to 
the widow is required to be paid from the community inter-
ests of the deceased and his widow. We think not. The right 
of a widow to receive a family allowance, pending the admin-
istration of the estate, is purely statutory. (Ii ills v. Supe-
rior Court, 207 Cal. 666 [279 Pac. 805, 65 A. L. R. 266] ; 11A 
Cal. JUl'. 505, sec. 367; 21 A m. JUl'. 560, sec. 314; 24 C. J. 230, 
sec. 758.) The will may direct that a specified sum of money 
for family allowance shall be paid from particularl.y desig-
nated property. (Prob. Code, sec. 750.) The section last 
mentioned provides that if the designated property' is insuffi-
cient' in value from which to pay the family allowance, the 
obligation shall be made a charge against' that portion of the 
estate not disposed of by the will.' It is further provided 
that if such designated property is not sufficient for that pur-
pose 'the property given to residuary legatees or devisees 
shall be resorted to, and thereafter all other property devised 
and bequeathed is liable for the same, in proportion to the 
value or amount of the several devises and legacies, but the 
specific devises and legacies are exempt from such liability 
if it appears to the court necessary to carry into effect the 
intention of the testator, and there is other sufficient estate.' " 
It here should be noted that the testator made no reference 
in his will to the payment either of a family allowance or of 
any debt or expense of administration, nor did he designate 
any property out of which such or any expense was to be paid. 
However, it is the appellants' contention that the provisions 
Feb. 1942.] ESTATE OF KING. 
[19 c. (2d) 354] 
363 
of section 750 of the Pr.,bate Code were applicable here,-
that unner such application all of the community property 
distrihnted to the widow was property "not disposed of by 
the win," and therefore that such property should have been 
first resorted to for the payment of the family allowance 
and other expenses of administration. 
To recapitulate, by her renunciation of the will, and ac-
cording to the rules of succession, the widow succeeded to her 
half of the entire community property, over which portion 
the husband had no right of testamentary disposition. That 
portion consisted of: an undivided one-half interest in the 
Edgewood ranch; a one-third interest in the Magoffey ranch; 
a one-half interest in the two small notes; and cash in the sum 
of $12,930.37. In addition thereto, she succeeded to the en-
tire community interest in the Peterich ranch. Her succes-
sion to that entire interest was based on her statutory one-half 
community ownership· therein and, pursuant to the provisions 
of section 201, Probate Code, on her right to succeed to the 
other half as community property over which her deceased 
husband's exercise of his right of testamentary disposition 
became ineffective as a result of her renunciation of the will. 
With respect to all the community property to which the 
widow succeeded solely by virtue of her statutory one-half 
interest, by operation of law, on the death of her husband 
such property "belonged to" her asthe surviving wife (Prob. 
Code, sec. 201). It therefore may not be successfully argued 
that where, as here, the husband attempted to dispose of the 
wife's community interest it thereafter became property" not 
disposed of by the will," and that therefore it should have 
been first resorted to for the payment of family allowance 
and expenses of administration. Such property never be-
longed to the husband and the failure of his testamentary dis. 
position thereof could not operate to place it in the category 
of property "not disposed of by the will." (Estate of Hasel· 
bud, 26 Cal. A.pp. (2d) 375 [79 Pac. (2d) 443]; Estate of 
Marinos, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 8 [102 Pac. (2d) 443].) 
But it is contended by the appellants that, ,in any event, the 
community interest in the Peterich ranch over which the tes-
tator possessed the right of testamentary disposition, i. e., his 
community half of such property, having failed as a devise 
became property "not disposed of by the will." Under the 
provisions of section 201, Probate Code, in the absence of a 
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testamentary disposition by a deceased spouse of his one-half 
of the community property, on his death such portion "goes 
to'" the surviving spouse. rrhe husband is ~harged with 
knowledge that if he makes a testamentary disposition of the 
wife's half of the community property the law gives her the 
right of renunciation of the will, with whatever attendant 
benefits may flow therefrom. In the present case, one of the 
effects of the widow's renunciation was to revoke and render 
inoperative as a devise the decedent's testamentary disposi-
tion of his one-half of the Peterich ranck As another result 
of her election to renounce the will the widow became entitled 
to that one-half interest by virtue of the statutory right con-
ferred on her by the provisions of section 201, to receive 
such property in the absence of an effective testamentary dis-
position thereof by her deceased husband. The effect of her 
renunciation of the will was to entitle her to the benefit of 
the statutes of succ·ession "as fully and completely as if there 
had been no will." (Estate of Bump, 152 Cal. 274 [92 Pac. 
643] ; l1A Cal. Jur., pp. 513, 514.) It follows that as to the 
widow such property cannot be regarded as property "no~ 
disposed of by the will" and therefore cannot be subjected 
first to the payment of family allowance or any other expense 
of administration. 
Moreover, by section 751 of the Probate Code it is pro-
vided that legacies shall be paid, first, from property ex-
pressly appropriated therefor by the will and, secondly, from 
, 'property not disposed of by the will." Therefore, were we 
to accept appellants' contention that in any event the re-
maining one-half of the Peterich ranch-which because of 
the widow's renunciation of the will became ineffective as a 
devise-should be regarded as property "not disposed of by 
the will," under the provisions of section 751 such property 
could be taken from the wife and resorted to for the payment 
of. legacies to other persons, a result which, obviously, the 
legislature never intended should follow from its reference in 
the several sections of the Probate Code to property "not dis-
posed of by the will." 
[7] The appellants also contend that under the provisions 
of section 202 of the Probate Code it was intended that the 
community property alone should be chargeable with the pay-
ment of family allowance and expenses of administration. We 
do not so interpret the section. 
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"In Estate of Finch, 173 Oal. 462 [160 Pac. 556], it is said 
at page 464: ' ... the surviving TVife is ... given the right 
to have a reasonable allowance made by the court for her 
'support from the estate of her deceased husband, whether the 
estate. was community property or his separate estate, and 
irreppective of whether the widow has estate of her own out 
of which she might support herself. ' 
I "Section 300 of the Probate CodespecificaJly provides that 
, 'All of his [decedent's] property suaiJ be subject to the pos-
session of the executor. or administrator and to the control 
of the Superior Court for the purpose of administration ... 
and shall be chargeable with the expenses of administering 
his estate, and the payment of his debts and the allowance to 
the family, except as otherwise provided in Ulis code.' " 
Alldin the case of Esta.te of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 
375 [79 Pac. (2d) 443], under the provisions of section 70, 
Probate ~ode, the will was revoked as to the surviving wife, 
and it was contended that the expenses of family allowance 
and other debts of administration should be paid entirely fro:n 
community funds to which the widow had succeeded. It was 
there held that section 750 was not applicable and that, pur:-
suant to the provisions of section 300, ,such expenses were to 
be borne ratably by the community and separate property of 
the decedent. 
"A contrary construction of the statute might result in 
charging the obligation of an estate to pay family allowance 
to a wic.ow against her own community interest in the prop-
erty. That construction is opposed to the policy of the law 
with respect to family allowances. [See note in 98 A. L. R., 
at page 1326. j . . . 
"'\Ve conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, 
the court properly heJd that the family allowance [as well 
as other expenses of administration] was chargeable to the 
assets of the estate without regard to whether it consists of 
community or separate property of the decedent." 
The 8 ppellants' separate contention that the court wrong-
fully distributed to the widow any community property other 
than that in which she possessed a statutory one-half interest, 
has been fully discussed hereinbefore. 
The decree settling the final account and ordering distribu-
tion o~ the estate is affirmed. 
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Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
Carter, J., did not participate herein. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.- I dissent from that part of 
the opinion upholding the charging of the debts, expenses of 
administration, and the family allowance against the respec-
tive persons interested in the estate in the proportion that 
each shared in the estate. 
Probate Code section 201 provides: "Upon the death of 
either husband or wife, one half of the community property 
belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject to 
the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the ab-
sence thereof goes to the surviving spouse." Respondent, 
testator's widow, after renouncing her right to take under 
the will, succeeded to one-half of all the community property 
as a matter of right under the above section. She was given 
all of the Peterich Ranch, which was community property, on 
the basis of the above section, because her husband, the testa-
tor, had failed to make an effective testamentary disposition 
of his half. 
The court charged the debts of the testator and the ex-
penses of administration, including a family allowance to 
the widow, against the respective persons interested in the 
estate in the proportion that they shared in the estate. Pro-
bate Code section 750 provides: "If the testator makes provi-
sion by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated, 
for the payment of his debts, the expenses of administration, 
or family allowance, they must be paid according to such pro-
vision out of the estate thus appropriated, so far as the same 
is sufficient. If insufficient, that portion of the estate not dis-
posed of by the will, if any, must be appropriated for that 
purpose." (Italics added.) The testator did not designate in 
his will any particular portion of the estate to be used for 
the payment of his debts, administration expenses, and family 
allowance. Therefore, under section 750, that portion of the 
estate not disposed of by will should be resorted to for the 
payment of these amounts before other portions of the estate 
are assessed. Since one-half the community property auto-
matically passes to the surviving wife upon the husband '8 
death he has no power to dispose of it by will, and it there-
fore does not constitute a portion of his estate within the 
Feb. 1942.] ESTA'I.'E OF' KING. 
[19 o. (2d) 354] 
36'1 
meaning of section 750. Although it is subject to his debts 
and administration expenses by virtue of Probate Code sec-
tion 202, it cannot be first resorted to under section 750. 
(Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 375 [79 Pac. (2d) 
443].) The testator, however, has the power to dispose of 
the other half of the community property by will. If he 
does not do so, it must be considered a portion of his estate 
not disposed of by win within the meaning of section 750. 
If he faHs to dispose of it by will, it passes to his wife under 
section 201, but in this respect it does not differ materially 
from separate property of which he makes no testamentary 
disposition. When he does not dispose of some of his sepa-
rate property by will, it passes to his wife, his wife and chil-
dren, or to other heirs, according to the laws of intestate 
succession. The latter half of section 201 simply fixes the 
intestate succession to the deceased spouse's half of the com-
munity pro:perty. Thus, if a testator does not dispose of his 
half of the community property by will it constitutes prop-
erty not disposed of by win within the meaning of section 750 
and must be resorted to first for the payment of debts and 
administration expenses, if no property is svecifically appro-
priated for this purpose, just as if it were separate property 
undispos~d of by will. 
Estate of IIaselbu,d, supra, is distinguishable from the pres-
ent situati;"'n. In that case the deced~nt married after he 
made his will. His widow was therefore a pretermitted heir; 
under Probate Coc1e section 70 the will was revoked as to her 
and she was entitled to her intestate share of the estate. Since 
section 750 has no application to the estates of persons dying 
completely intestate, the court, in order to insure the wife's 
receiving the share of the estate that she would receive if the 
husband died completely intestate, properly held that the 
property which the wife took as her intestate share of the 
estate, including all of the community property, should not 
~ be resorted to first for the payment of debts and expenses 
under section 750, but should be charged for the debts and 
expenses on the same basis that it would be charged if the 
husband died completely intestate. In the present case, how-
ever, the respondent's renunciation of her right to take under 
the will does not entitle her to an intestate share of the 
estate, but merely gives her the right to take her half of the 
community property free from the testamentary disposition 
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made of it by ·the testator. She takes the other half of the 
Peterich Ranch, not on the-)theory that her husband died in-
testate but because after her renunciation it remained undis-
posed of by will. 
In the present case, therefore, one-half of the Peterich 
Ranch constitutes property undisposed of by the will of the 
testator and, under section 750, should be resorted to for the 
payment of debts, administration expenses, and the family 
allowance, before other portions of the estate are charged. 
Gibson, C. J" concurred. 
[Sac. No. 5393. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1942.] 
MARIE A. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. C. L. BEST, Respondent. 
[1] 
[2] 
Waters-Procedure-Evidence-Ownership.-In an action to 
enjoin the pollution of a stream, a finding against the owner-
ship of a water right appurtenant to a ranch was not sup-
ported by evidence where the uncontradicted evidence showed 
that, through successive conveyances over a period of 50 
years, the right was finally conveyed to the plaintiff by a deed 
to her as appurtenant to the ranch, where it also showed an 
uninterrupted beneficial use of the water by the successive 
owners of the ranch, and where, though the extent of the 
right as originally secured was not shown, some of the deeds 
and the testimony of a witness described the capacity of the 
flume and ditch. 
ld.-Procedure-Pleading-Appropriation.-The ultimate fact 
of ownership of a water right is sufficiently averred where 
[2] See 26 Cal. Jur. 519. 
McK. Dig: References: [1] Waters, § 726; [2] Waters, § 705; 
[3] Waters, § 285 (3); [4] Waters, §§281; 285; [5] Evidence, 
§ 261; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1237; [7] Waters, § 318; Sales, § 9; 
[8] Waters, § 342; [9, 14] Waters, § 318; [10] Easements, § 2; 
[11] Waters, §§ 29, 318; [12] Easements, § 59; [13] Easements, 
§§ 7, 59; [15, 16, 18] Waters, § 284; [17, 19] Injunctions, § 36. 
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the complaint alleges that the plaintiff and her predecessors 
in interest have owned a right in the waters of a creek, 
acquired in a designated year by diversion and continuous use 
upon the ranch of the plaintiff for irrigation and domestic 
purposes. 
[3] ld.-Interference of Third . Parties-Pollution-Evidence.-
A finding that the waters of' a creek were not polluted or 
rendered unfit for domestic, household and agricultural pur-
poses was not supported where the evidence showed the dump-
ing in the stream of quantities of sand, clay, gravel and mill 
tailings, and where there was testimony as to the discolora-
tion of the water, its unfitness for drinking and irrigation 
purposes, its clogging of pipelines and ditches, and the wear-
ing out of power machinery. 
[4] ld.-Interference of Third Parties-Pollution-As Between 
Appropriators-Remedies.-An appropriator of waters of a 
stream, as against upper owners with inferior rights of user, 
is entitled to have the water at his point of diversion pre-
served in its natural state of purity; and any use which cor-
rupts the water so as essentially to impair its usefulness for 
the purposes to which he originally devoted it, is an invasion 
of his rights. Any material deterioration of the quality of 
the water by subsequent appropriators or others without 
superior rights entitles him to both injunctive and legal relief .. 
[5] Evidence-Hearsay-Exceptions-Declarations of Deceased 
Persons.-Declarations of a deceased predecessor in title of 
a party, made in relation to the property before he parted 
with his interest therein, such as declarations as to h!s receipt 
of a sum in settlement of a dispute as to the pollution of the 
water, constitute admissible hearsay evidence and are binding 
upon his successors in title either as declarations against 
pecuniary interest or as in the nature of vicarious admissions. 
Such evidence, although not entirely satisfactory, will support 
a finding, particularly in the absence of any showing to the 
contrary. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1849, 1853.) 
[6] Appeal- Review - Questions of Law and Fact - Review of 
Credibility.-Obje.ctions to testimony on the ground of its 
remoteness or inconsistencies therein relate not to the admissi~ 
bility and suffi.ciency, but to the weight and credibility, mat~ 
ters not considered by the appellate. court. 
[7] Waters - Contracts - Validity and Construction - Polluting 
Water: Sales-Subject Matter-Quality.-An agreement be-
tween a mining company and the owner of a water right 
[4J See 26 Cal. Jur. 188. 
